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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
trademark docket was quiet in 2011.  The Federal Circuit issued only 
six trademark decisions,1 designating two of them as precedential.2  
The court issued a considerably higher number of trademark 
opinions in prior years.3  
The smaller number of trademark cases on the court’s docket 
might be driven by economic considerations and the reduced 
number of trademark applications filed in 2009 and 2010.  In 2009, 
352,051 trademark applications were filed, nearly 50,000 fewer than 
the 401,392 applications filed in 2008.4  In 2010, trademark filings 
increased slightly to 368,939.5  Given the average length of trademark 
prosecution and timelines for proceedings at the Trademark Trial 
and Appeals Board (TTAB), a disputed trademark application filed 
in late 2009 or 2010 would generally be heard at the Federal Circuit 
in 2011.6  
In recent years, several trademark appeals have reached the 
                                                          
 1. Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 665 F.3d 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V., 447 F. App’x 197 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., Nos. 2011-1052, -1053, 
2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2011) (per curiam); Citigroup Inc. v. 
Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); Dalton v. Honda Motor Co., 425 F. App’x 886 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 
Craig v. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc., 433 F. App’x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam).  
 2. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089; Citigroup, 637 F.3d 
at 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253. 
 3. The Federal Circuit issued twenty-three trademark decisions in 2010 (eight 
designated precedential), sixteen trademark decisions in 2009 (nine designated 
precedential), eight trademark decisions in 2008 (one designated precedential), 
fifteen trademark decisions in 2007 (eight designated precedential), and eleven 
trademark decisions in 2006 (seven designated precedential).  Susan B. Flohr et al., 
2010 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1159, 1160–61 
(2011); Rebeccah Gan, 2009 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1115, 1116 (2010); David M. Kelly & Stephanie H. Bald, 2008 Trademark Law 
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 947, 948 (2009); Susan M. Kayser & 
David Jaquette, 2007 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1039, 1040 (2008); Christine Haight Farley & Geri L. Haight, Review of the 2006 
Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 987, 988–89 (2007). 
 4. Trademarks Dashboard, Data Visualization Center, Application Metrics (First 
Quarter FY 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/trademarks/main.dashxml 
(follow “Open the Excel datasheet” hyperlink). 
 5. Id.  In 2011, the number of applications increased again to 398,667.  Id. 
 6. See, e.g., id. (showing the average number of months from application filing 
to final disposition at the PTO, including in cases involving an inter partes 
proceeding at the TTAB, is fifteen months); see also U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FED. CIRCUIT, Median Time to Disposition in Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submission, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/Median_Disp 
_Time_table_02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2012) (showing median time for 
disposition in cases appealed from the PTO to the Federal Circuit, from docketing 
date to disposition date, is eight to eleven months over the last five years).  
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Federal Circuit via district courts, the International Trade 
Commission, and even the United States Court of Federal Claims.7  
All of the 2011 appeals, however, originated in the TTAB,8 an 
administrative tribunal within the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO).  Five cases involved opposition 
proceedings,9 and one involved a cancellation proceeding.10  Four of 
the Federal Circuit’s trademark opinions primarily addressed 
substantive trademark law,11 one covered a procedural issue,12 and 
one considered both substantive and procedural issues.13  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decisions in all six cases.   
Of the five trademark opinions that addressed substantive issues, 
two were affirmed without opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36 
after the parties fully briefed and argued the appeals.14  While the 
                                                          
 7. See, e.g., ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 
1280, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (appeal from district court 
involving both patent claims and trademark claims); Green Edge Enters., LLC v. 
Rubber Mulch Etc., LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 1290, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (appeal from district court involving patent claims and trademark 
counterclaims); Deere & Co. v. ITC, 605 F.3d 1350, 1351, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206, 
1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (appeal from the International Trade Commission involving a 
claim of trademark infringement based on gray market goods under the Tariff Act of 
1930); Siler v. United States, 296 F. App’x 32, 32–33 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(appeal involving copyright and trademark claims against the United States, in which 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction 
over trademark claims). 
 8.  Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 665 F.3d 1263, 1264, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1089, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V., 447 F. 
App’x 197 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., Nos. 2011-
1052, -1053, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2011) (per curiam); Citigroup 
Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253, 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Dalton v. Honda Motor Co., 425 F. App’x 886, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam); Craig v. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc., 433 F. App’x 901, 901–02 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 9. Estrada, 447 F. App’x at 198; Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1; 
Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254; Dalton, 425 F. App’x at 887; 
Craig, 433 F. App’x at 902. 
 10. Benedict, 665 F.3d 1263, 1264, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089. 
 11. Estrada, 447 F. App’x at 201; Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1; 
Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254; Craig, 433 F. App’x at 902. 
 12. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1269, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089. 
 13. Dalton, 425 F. App’x at 889. 
 14. Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (without opinion); Craig, 433 F. 
App’x at 902 (without opinion).  Rule 36 allows the court to affirm a lower court or 
administrative agency decision without opinion when the opinion would not be 
precedential and any of the following conditions exists:   
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based 
on findings that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence supporting the 
jury’s verdict is sufficient; (c) the record support summary judgment, 
directed verdict, or judgment on the pleadings; (d) the decision of an 
administrative agency warrants affirmance under the standard of review in 
the statute authorizing the petition for review; or (e) a judgment or decision 
has been entered without an error of law. 
FED. CIR. R. 36. 
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number of Rule 36 affirmances decreased from five in 2010 to two in 
2011, the percentage of affirmances in 2011 increased:  in 2010, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed thirty-three percent of appeals of substantive 
trademark issues without opinion;15 in 2011, the court affirmed forty 
percent without opinion.16  
In the two precedential cases (one on substantive law, one on 
procedural grounds), the Federal Circuit did not fully agree with the 
TTAB’s analyses or the justifications for its final decisions.  In 
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc.,17 the Federal Circuit 
disapproved of the TTAB’s “reasonable manner” test to analyze 
whether a likelihood of confusion exists between two marks.18  
Although the court affirmed the TTAB’s likelihood of confusion 
finding, it stated that the TTAB should no longer use the “reasonable 
manner” test.19  Then, in Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc.,20 the court 
determined that Trademark Rule 2.127(d)21—which governs the 
TTAB process and procedure after a dispositive motion has been 
filed—is ambiguous and interpreted the rule’s effect on suspension 
of a trademark proceeding after a summary judgment motion has 
been filed.22  The court noted that the plain language of the rule does 
not clearly coincide with the TTAB’s interpretation of the rule,23 and 
this inconsistency can confuse practitioners about how the TTAB will 
apply the rule.24  Despite this ambiguity, the court ultimately upheld 
the TTAB’s decision based on the facts of the case and on other 
TTAB rules.25  
The Federal Circuit’s 2011 trademark decisions are discussed in 
detail below.  When an opinion addresses more than one issue, the 
issues may be broken up and discussed separately, particularly when 
substantive and procedural issues are covered in the same opinion. 
                                                          
 15. Flohr et al., supra note 3, at 1162.  
 16. Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1; Craig, 433 F. App’x at 901. 
 17. 637 F.3d 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 18. Id. at 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59. 
 19. Id. at 1353, 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59, 1261. 
 20. 665 F.3d 1263, 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 21. 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2011). 
 22. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1267–68, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 23. Id. at 1267, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 24. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.  Pro se applicants, like Benedict, might be 
particularly susceptible to confusion. 
 25. Id. at 1269, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092–93. 
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I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Likelihood of Confusion 
1. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc. 
In the first Federal Circuit trademark opinion of 2011, the court 
affirmed the TTAB’s decision to deny an opposition filed by 
Citigroup.26  In 2006, Capital City Bank (CCB) applied to register 
several standard character marks that use the phrase “Capital City 
Bank.”27  Citigroup opposed CCB’s applications, arguing that 
consumers were likely to confuse CCB’s marks (CAPITAL CITY 
BANK, CAPITAL CITY BANK INVESTMENTS, CAPITAL CITY 
BANK GROWING BUSINESS, and CAPITAL CITY BANC 
INVESTMENTS) with Citigroup’s CITIBANK mark.28  
The TTAB applied the likelihood of confusion factors listed in In re 
E.I. DuPont De Nemours29 to determine whether likelihood of 
confusion existed under Lanham Act § 2(d).30  The TTAB found that 
                                                          
 26. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 27. Id. at 1348, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 28. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.  At the TTAB, Citigroup also alleged a 
dilution as a ground for opposition, but it dropped this claim on appeal.  Id. at 1348–
49, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 29. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  The 
DuPont likelihood of confusion factors are:   
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  (2) The 
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in 
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in 
use.  (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade 
channels.  (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are 
made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.  (5) The fame of 
the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).  (6) The number and 
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.  (7) The nature and extent 
of any actual confusion.  (8) The length of time during and conditions 
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual 
confusion.  (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house 
mark, “family” mark, product mark).  (10) The market interface between 
application and the owner of a prior mark:  (a) a mere “consent” to register 
or use, (b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e. 
limitations on continued use of the marks by each party, (c) assignment of 
mark, application, registration and good will of the related business, or (d) 
laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of 
lack of confusion.  (11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude 
others from use of its mark on its goods.  (12) The extent of potential 
confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.  (13) Any other 
established fact probative of the effect of use. 
 Id., 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567. 
 30. Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1348, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.  Section 2(d) of the 
Lanham Act provides: 
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished 
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal 
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four of the thirteen DuPont factors favored Citigroup, namely:  (1) the 
fame of Citigroup’s mark, (2) the similarity between Citibank’s 
services and CCB’s services, (3) the similarity of trade channels, and 
(4) the type of consumers.31  But two significant factors—actual 
confusion and the similarity of the marks—favored CCB.32  After 
weighing the relevant factors, the TTAB concluded that registration 
of CCB’s marks was not likely to confuse consumers.33  Citigroup 
appealed that ruling to the Federal Circuit.34 
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit primarily focused on the factors 
that favored CCB.  Looking at the similarity of the marks, the Federal 
Circuit said that the CITIBANK mark was too different from CCB’s 
mark to cause confusion.35  The distinctive “I” misspelling of 
CITIBANK is actually what prevented it from prevailing on this 
factor.36  The court drew from prior analysis of Citigroup’s mark,37 
which found that the “I” misspelling in Citigroup’s marks is key to its 
trademark ownership and scope of protection.38   The court also 
noted that CCB’s marks include the word “Capital” with “City Bank,” 
which distinguishes CCB’s marks from Citigroup’s.39   Although the 
presence of an additional term like “Capital” does not automatically 
defeat a likelihood of confusion finding, here, the additional word 
was one of several distinctions between the two marks.40   
The Federal Circuit also analyzed whether any actual confusion 
existed.  The TTAB had noted that the two banks had been operating 
in the same geographic markets for over thirty-five years, but neither 
party knew of any actual confusion.41  The TTAB found that the lack 
of misdirected phone calls, requests for information, or other 
evidence of confusion, combined with a long history of competition, 
indicated that customers were not confused by the marks.42  On 
                                                          
register on account of its nature unless it . . . (d) [c]onsists of or comprises a 
mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by 
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, with used on or in connection 
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006).  
 31. Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1348, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 32. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 33. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 34. Id. at 1348–49, 98 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1255–56. 
 35. Id. at 1349, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. 
 36. Id. at 1349–50, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256–57. 
 37. Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 38. Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1350, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256. 
 39. Id. at 1351, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257. 
 40. Id. at 1351–54, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257–59. 
 41. Id. at 1354, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 42. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
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appeal, Citigroup argued that because not all of the opposed marks 
had been used in commerce, the actual confusion factor should be 
given less weight.43  The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that the 
TTAB had enough evidence to find that no actual confusion 
existed.44 
Citigroup also argued that the TTAB weighed the relevant factors 
incorrectly.  Citigroup contended that the TTAB should have found a 
likelihood of confusion because a greater number of the DuPont 
factors weighed in favor of Citigroup than in favor of CCB.45  The 
Federal Circuit reminded Citigroup that the TTAB “may find a single 
factor dispositive,”46 and concluded—primarily based on the 
dissimilarity of the marks—that “CCB’s marks are not likely to cause 
confusion with Citigroup’s marks.”47  
The most notable part of the case was the Federal Circuit’s 
instruction, in dicta, to the TTAB to abandon the “reasonable 
manner” doctrine.48  The TTAB had adopted this standard to analyze 
standard character marks.49  Under this doctrine, the TTAB would 
first determine the reasonable variations of font size, style, and colors 
in which a proposed mark might be displayed, and then decide if 
those variations would be likely to cause confusion with the prior 
mark.50  For example, if the TTAB did not think that red lettering on 
a red background would be a reasonable way to show a mark, it would 
not consider that option.51  The Federal Circuit rejected the 
“reasonable manner” approach, stating, “[t]he TTAB should simply 
use the DuPont factors to determine the likelihood of confusion 
between depictions of standard character marks that vary in font 
style, size, and color and the other mark.”52  
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the “reasonable manner” 
doctrine was not based on trademark law it had approved or adopted, 
remarking that the doctrine “is unsupported by anything other than 
TTAB practice.”53  Even though the court agreed with the TTAB’s 
ultimate conclusion on the confusion issue, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 43. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259–60. 
 44. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 45. Id. at 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 46. Id. at 1355, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 47. Id. at 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 48. Id. at 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59. 
 49. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 50. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59. 
 51. See id. at 1352–53, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258 (identifying several 
proceedings in which the TTAB applied the “reasonable manner” approach to 
consider applicants’ proposed registration of typed, block, or script marks). 
 52. Id. at 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.  
 53. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
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unequivocally stated that the TTAB’s reasonableness approach is 
incorrect and should not be used in future opinions.54 
2. Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V. 
The case of Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V.55 
demonstrates that a trademark applicant’s ulterior motives are 
sometimes fairly easy to discern, and neither the TTAB nor the 
Federal Circuit looks favorably on ill-intentioned applicants.  
Estrada, who lives in Mexico, applied for U.S. trademark 
registration for the mark AUDITORIO TELMEX in connection with 
arenas and services, including sports, concert, and convention 
facilities and events.56  Telefonos opposed registration because of its 
TELMEX mark, which is not registered with the PTO but has been 
used in the U.S. and Mexico in connection with telecommunications 
and other related services.57 
Telefonos had been using TELMEX in Mexico for six decades.58  It 
sponsors a large concert arena in Guadalajara, Mexico, which, 
notably, is called AUDITORIO TELMEX.59  This arena held the 2008 
Latin American MTV Music Awards, an event that was telecast 
worldwide over the Internet.60  Telefonos also sells telephone-calling 
cards in the U.S. that display the TELMEX mark with artwork and 
promotions for Telefonos-sponsored sports and entertainment 
events.61 
The TTAB sustained the oppositions to Estrada’s applications.62  
The Federal Circuit also agreed that Estrada’s trademark applications 
for AUDITORIO TELMEX should be denied on likelihood of 
confusion grounds.63  Before the TTAB, Telefonos provided a witness 
who testified that Telefonos had been selling telephone-calling cards 
bearing the TELMEX mark in the U.S. since 2000.64  The TTAB 
found this activity was sufficient to establish Telefonos’s priority to 
the TELMEX mark.65  
Also, the Federal Circuit noted that even though the TELMEX 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 1353–54, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59. 
 55. 447 F. App’x 197 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 56. Id. at 199. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 200. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 201, 204. 
 64. Id. at 200, 202. 
 65. Id. at 201–02. 
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mark is not famous, it is a coined term, and therefore it is inherently 
distinctive and strong.66  The court also concluded that other 
confusion factors, such as the real-world overlap between 
telecommunication, arena, and entertainment services, supported 
the TTAB’s decision to deny Estrada’s registration request.67  Based 
on this evidence, Telefonos demonstrated that consumers would 
likely be confused between the TELMEX and AUDITORIO TELMEX 
marks.68  
The most remarkable part of this decision was that the TTAB and 
the Federal Circuit considered evidence of Estrada’s bad faith when 
applying the thirteenth DuPont confusion factor.69  This catch-all 
factor, which allows the TTAB to weigh “any other established fact 
probative of the effect of use,”70 gives the TTAB and the court some 
additional flexibility in their analyses.  
In this case, the TTAB and the Federal Circuit considered Estrada’s 
questionable testimony in their analyses of the thirteenth confusion 
factor.71  The TTAB found that Estrada had lived in Mexico for nearly 
thirty years, during which “use of [the] TELMEX mark [had] been 
ubiquitous.”72  Estrada had also lived within ten miles of the 
AUDITORIO TELMEX arena since 1980.73  Despite these clear 
connections, Estrada claimed that he was unfamiliar with the 
TELMEX mark, and that he chose AUDITORIO TELMEX for his 
mark because it “sounds good for the services upon which it will be 
used.  Is [sic] an easy listening phrase.”74  The TTAB found this 
testimony disingenuous and concluded that it supported a finding of 
bad faith.75  The Federal Circuit agreed.76  Even though other factors 
provided enough evidence that a likelihood of confusion existed 
between the two marks, this evidence of bad faith further buttressed 
the court’s opinion.77 
                                                          
 66. Id. at 202. 
 67. Id. at 202–03. 
 68. Id. at 203. 
 69. Id. at 203–04. 
 70. Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 200. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 203–04. 
 77. See generally id. at 201–04 (reviewing the TTAB’s assessment of the DuPont 
factors).  The Federal Circuit panel also highlighted TTAB’s comment that the “bad 
faith would have tipped the balance to a finding of likelihood of confusion” if the 
other factors had not already done so.  Id. at 204. 
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3. Craig v. Kenneth Cole Productions (LIC), Inc.  
In Craig v. Kenneth Cole Productions (LIC), Inc.,78 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, without a written opinion, the TTAB’s decision79 to sustain 
an opposition to Craig’s application for the mark LE TIGRE used on 
pens and on leather goods.80 
Kenneth Cole owns a registration for a stylized Le TIGRÉ 
trademark for clothing, which it has used since 1979.81  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kenneth Cole argued that its LeTIGRÉ (stylized) mark is famous, it 
is identical to the applied-for mark, and registration of Craig’s mark 
would be likely to cause confusion and dilution.82  Given the Federal 
Circuit’s summary affirmance of this decision, the TTAB’s opinion 
illustrates the relevant analysis and reasoning supporting the 
successful opposition. 
The TTAB first examined the similarities between the marks and 
concluded that the marks are nearly identical.83  The TTAB noted 
that while Kenneth Cole’s registered mark is stylized and includes an 
accent over the final “e,” these differences are minor when 
considering the overall similarities of the marks in the minds of 
consumers.84  The TTAB found that this DuPont factor weighed 
strongly in favor of Kenneth Cole.85 
The TTAB then looked at the next factor:  the similarities of the 
goods.  The TTAB reiterated that goods or services do not have to be 
“identical or even competitive” to be related for the purposes of this 
analysis.86  That is, “[t]he goods need only be sufficiently related that 
consumers would be likely to assume, upon encountering the goods 
under similar marks, that the goods originate from, are sponsored or 
                                                          
 78. Craig v. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc., 433 F. App’x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam). 
 79. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc. v. Craig, 2010 WL 1233880, at *1 (T.T.A.B. 
Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d, 433 F. App’x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 80. Craig, 433 F. App’x at 902. 
 81. Kenneth Cole Prods., 2010 WL 1233880, at *1. 
 82. Id. at *1. 
 83. Id. at *5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at *6. 
 86. Id. at *8. 
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authorized by, or are otherwise connected to the same source.”87  
When considering this factor, the TTAB relied on testimony from 
Kenneth Cole’s trademark and licensing manager, who cited other 
luxury brands such as COACH, LOUIS VUITTON, and KATE SPADE 
as companies that have used the same mark on clothing, pens, and 
planners.88  Another witness testified that companies in this industry 
regularly sell both clothing and small leather goods under the same 
mark.89  Even though the goods associated with Kenneth Cole’s 
registration were different from those listed in Craig’s application, 
the TTAB ultimately found that this factor also weighed in favor of 
Kenneth Cole.90  
The TTAB also considered the other DuPont factors and found that 
they were either neutral or weighed in favor of Kenneth Cole.91  
Based on its analysis, the TTAB found likelihood of confusion and 
sustained the opposition.92 
The TTAB did not address the dilution claim because it had 
already sustained the opposition on likelihood of confusion 
grounds.93  The TTAB explained in its likelihood of confusion 
analysis that although Kenneth Cole had shown its mark was strong, it 
had not demonstrated that the mark was famous.94  The TTAB 
distinguished between evidence of fame and evidence of a strong 
mark.  In evaluating the strength of the mark, the TTAB focused on 
the fact that the mark was arbitrary for clothing, pens, and leather 
goods and commented that the mark is well known.95  Considering 
fame, however, the TTAB emphasized that Kenneth Cole had not 
provided any financial information about sales and advertising of 
LeTIGRÉ clothing.96  Without this evidence, the TTAB could not 
assess the mark’s exposure to the media and the public.97  Because 
                                                          
 87. Id.  Kenneth Cole also argued that it had common law rights to the use of its 
mark on other goods, but the TTAB limited its analysis to the goods listed in 
Kenneth Cole’s registration because Kenneth Cole had not established priority of use 
on the additional goods.  Id. at *4. 
 88. Id. at *8–9. 
 89. Id. at *9. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at *9–10 (finding that because the trade channels and classes of 
purchasers of the goods in question have no restrictions, there is likely overlap 
between the goods of both parties); see also id. at *7–8 (holding that the third-party 
use of the same or similar marks on similar goods did not weigh in favor of either 
Kenneth Cole or Craig). 
 92. Id. at *10. 
 93. Id. at *10 n.10. 
 94. Id. at *10. 
 95. Id. at *7. 
 96. Id. at *6. 
 97. Id. 
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Kenneth Cole did not meet its burden of proving the mark was 
famous, the dilution claim would have failed anyway.98  
4. Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp.  
In Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp.,99 a per curiam judgment 
without opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision to 
sustain three oppositions:  two based on likelihood of confusion 
grounds, and one based on functionality grounds.100  The 
functionality issue will be discussed in a later section.  
This case involved three dueling oppositions between Brinkmann 
Corporation and Mag Instrument.101  Mag Instrument opposed 
Brinkmann’s application to register MAGNUM MAXFIRE for 
flashlights, and Brinkmann opposed both Mag Instrument’s 
application to register MAG STAR for flashlights, flashlight 
accessories, and flashlight parts, as well as Mag Instrument’s 
application to register a “dual band” configuration mark for 
flashlights.102   
In the first proceeding, which dealt with Brinkmann’s application 
for MAGNUM MAXFIRE, Mag Instrument argued that Brinkmann’s 
MAGNUM MAXFIRE mark was likely to cause confusion with Mag 
Instrument’s MAG-NUM STAR mark.103  In an interesting move, 
Brinkmann asserted a Morehouse defense,104 named after the case from 
which it originated.105  An applicant may use a Morehouse defense to a 
likelihood of confusion claim only when the defending party already 
owns an unchallenged registration for a mark that is the same or 
substantially identical to its challenged mark.106  Also, the 
unchallenged mark must be associated with goods or services that are 
the same or substantially similar to those it seeks to cover with the 
new mark.107  Brinkmann argued that its registration of MAGNUM 
MAX for hand-held electrical spotlights met the criteria for a 
                                                          
 98. Id. at *10 n.10.  
 99. Nos. 2011-1052, -1053, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2011) (per 
curiam). 
 100. Id.  The court also sustained another Brinkmann opposition because the 
proposed mark is functional.  See infra Part I.B.1. 
 101. Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1701, 1705–
06 (T.T.A.B. 2010).   
 102. Id.   
 103. Id. at 1710–11. 
 104. Id. at 1711. 
 105. Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 160 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 715 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 106. Id. at 884, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 717. 
 107. Id., 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 717.  The policy motivation for this defense is that 
the opposer could not be harmed further by a new registration for a mark for goods 
so similar to the existing mark.  Id., 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 717. 
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successful Morehouse defense.108  The TTAB disagreed and found that 
MAGNUM MAXFIRE and MAGNUM MAX are not substantially 
identical.109  It also found that flashlights and hand-held electric 
spotlights are not similar enough to meet the threshold for 
application of the defense.110  Thus, the TTAB concluded that 
Brinkmann could not use the Morehouse defense.111 
The TTAB then explored the strong similarity of the marks.112  
Although MAG-NUM STAR (Mag Instrument’s mark) and MAGNUM 
MAXFIRE do not look or sound identical in their entirety, both 
marks have a nearly identical dominant element:  the first word 
“MAGNUM.”113  The TTAB also remarked that STAR and MAXFIRE 
both “suggest[] brilliance or illumination of the highest 
magnitude.”114  
The TTAB found that the other relevant DuPont factors—the 
similarity of the goods, channels of trade, and classes of consumers—
also favored Mag Instrument and so “the relevant DuPont factors 
weigh[ed] in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.”115  Thus, 
the TTAB sustained this opposition.116  
The TTAB’s analysis of Brinkmann’s opposition to Mag 
Instrument’s requested registration of MAG STAR proceeded in a 
similar manner.  The TTAB found that the two marks—Brinkmann’s 
MAXSTAR and Mag Instrument’s MAG STAR—differed only by one 
letter and one space.117  The TTAB did not accept Mag Instrument’s 
argument that customers would recognize the “MAG” part of the 
MAG STAR mark as referring to Mag Instrument.118  Thus, the 
similarity of the marks factor favored Brinkmann.119  The TTAB also 
found that the other relevant DuPont factors favored the opposing 
party, Brinkmann.120  Therefore, the TTAB concluded that there was 
                                                          
 108. Mag Instrument, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 109. Id. at 1711. 
 110. Id. at 1712 (citation omitted) (“The Morehouse defense requires the goods to 
be identical, substantially the same, or so related as to represent in law a distinction 
without a difference.”). 
 111. Id. at 1712. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1712–13. 
 114. Id. at 1713. 
 115. Id. at 1713–14. 
 116. Id. at 1714. 
 117. See id. (noting that “[v]isually, the only real difference is the third letter in 
each mark, ‘g’ and ‘x’ respectively”).  
 118. Id. at 1715.  The TTAB also mentioned that “it has been long held that the 
family of marks doctrine is unavailable to a defendant as a defense in an inter partes 
proceeding.” Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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a likelihood of confusion between the marks and sustained the 
opposition.121 
B. Functionality 
1. Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp.  
Mag Instrument also had to defend a proposed mark against a 
functionality analysis.122  The Lanham Act does not allow registration 
of “any matter that, as a whole, is functional.”123  The Supreme Court 
has defined a feature as functional “if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
article.”124  Brinkmann opposed Mag Instrument’s application to 
register a “dual band” configuration mark on functionality grounds.125  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In support of its functionality argument, Brinkman noted that Mag 
Instrument had an expired patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,388,673, which 
covered a rechargeable flashlight and holder.126  The bands on Mag 
Instrument’s patented flashlight contained a positive electrode and a 
negative electrode, respectively, which allow the flashlight’s battery to 
recharge when placed in the flashlight’s holder.127  According to 
Brinkmann, the dual bands are “‘necessary to charge the flashlight 
and the reason that the charging feature works.’”128  
When considering the functionality issue, the first question the 
TTAB tackled was:  what actually constitutes the applied-for mark?129  
                                                          
 121. Id. at 1716. 
 122. Id. at 1701. 
 123. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006). 
 124. Mag Instrument, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. 
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 n.10 (1982)).  The 
policy behind prohibiting trademark registration of functional features is that such 
registration might “inhibit[] legitimate competition by allowing a producer to 
control a useful product feature.” Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 
514 U.S. 159, 164, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1163 (1995)).   
 125. Id. at 1716. 
 126. Id. at 1718. 
 127. Id. at 1717. 
 128. Id. (quoting Brinkmann’s Opp’n Br. at 10). 
 129. Id. at 1716–17. 
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Brinkmann argued that the mark was merely two bands surrounding 
a flashlight barrel.130  Mag Instrument argued that the mark consisted 
of “two bands that are visibly contrasting from the rest of the 
flashlight.”131  The distinction is important because the way the bands 
look does not affect how they work.132  Mag Instrument said that it 
only wanted to register the visual aspects of the bands.133 
Referring to the Trademark Manual of Examination Procedure, the 
TTAB stated that a mark consists of a description of the proposed 
mark that an examining attorney accepts.134  The description must 
accurately characterize the mark and clearly explain what the mark 
comprises.135  Based on this definition, the TTAB agreed with 
Brinkmann’s characterization of the mark because nothing in Mag 
Instrument’s application or description indicated that the dual bands 
must look different from the barrel.136  
The TTAB’s characterization of the mark—that it is just two bands 
around the flashlight barrel—also sheds light on its functionality 
analysis.  Because the color or appearance of the bands is not part of 
the mark, the TTAB only considered the bands themselves.137  The 
TTAB then applied the factors from In re Morton-Norwich Products, 
Inc.138 to the dual band mark to determine if the mark was 
functional.139  Morton-Norwich lists the following factors as relevant to a 
functionality analysis:   
(1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian 
advantages of the design; (2) advertising materials in which the 
originator of the design touts the design’s utilitarian advantages; 
(3) the availability to competitors of functionally equivalent 
designs; and (4) facts indicating that the design results in 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 1716. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1717 (describing how Mag Instrument’s drawing of the dual bank mark 
only showed their placement and not how the contrasting bands on the MAG 
CHARGER flashlight exhibit are actually electrodes for charging). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1716 (citing U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL 
OF EXAMINATION PROCEDURE §§ 808.02–808.03 (2d ed. 1997) (“To be satisfactory, the 
description [of a mark] should state accurately what the mark comprises, and should 
not create a misleading impression by either positive statement or omission of facts . . 
. .  The examining attorney should require a description of the mark where the mark 
is three-dimensional . . . .  If applicable, the description statement must clearly 
indicate the portion of the product or container which the mark comprises . . . .”). 
 135. Id. (quoting U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 808.02 (2d ed. 1997)). 
 136. Id. at 1716–17 (“There is no indication in the application that the two bands 
contrast with the barrel of the flashlight.”). 
 137. Id. at 1717. 
 138. 671 F.2d 1332, 213 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 139. Mag Instrument, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718. 
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comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the 
product.140  
The first two factors were relevant and dispositive for the TTAB.  
The TTAB paid particular attention to Mag Instrument’s expired 
utility patent for the ring-charging flashlight.141  The TTAB 
determined that the patent’s abstract, drawings, and claims covered 
the same features as Mag Instrument’s applied-for mark:  two rings 
behind the head of the flashlight that are used to recharge the 
flashlight’s batteries.142 
Moreover, Mag Instrument’s advertising for this flashlight describes 
the dual bands as the “charger module” and extols the benefits of the 
charging bands as allowing the flashlight to charge in any position.143  
Because these two factors pointed to the utilitarian advantages of the 
dual bands, the TTAB sustained Brinkmann’s opposition based on 
the functionality doctrine.144 
For the sake of completeness, however, the TTAB discussed 
Brinkmann’s alternative argument that Mag Instrument’s “dual 
band” mark had not acquired secondary meaning or distinctiveness.145  
For trade dress or product design to receive a trademark registration 
on the principal register, the applicant must show that the mark has 
acquired secondary meaning, or that customers associate the design 
with the source of the goods.146  Under section 2(f) of the Lanham 
Act, “nothing . . . shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the 
applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in 
commerce.”147  Mag Instrument applied for registration under section 
2(f), and the PTO approved the mark for publication.148  This 
approval created “a presumption that the examining attorney found 
that the applicant made a prima facie showing of acquired 
distinctiveness.”149  Brinkmann therefore had the initial burden of 
presenting a prima facie case that Mag Instrument’s mark had not 
                                                          
 140. Id. (citing Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 141. See id. (highlighting the “vital significance” of a prior patent in a trademark 
claim). 
 142. Id. at 1720. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1722. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1065, 1068 (2000).  
 147. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). 
 148. 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722. 
 149. Id. (citing Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1576, 6 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
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acquired secondary meaning.150  If Brinkmann successfully met its 
burden, Mag Instrument would have to present additional evidence 
of secondary meaning to show that it overcame Brinkmann’s 
showing.151 
The TTAB found that Brinkmann met its burden when it 
demonstrated that the primary significance of the dual bands is their 
charging function and concluded that Mag Instrument had not 
overcome Brinkmann’s prima facie showing.152  Although Mag 
Instrument submitted sixteen declarations to show acquired 
distinctiveness during the prosecution of the application, the TTAB 
found that the declarations had limited probative value because they 
“[were] nearly identical in wording and thus [did] not appear to have 
been prepared in the signer’s own words.”153  Moreover, the 
declarants were not consumers; nearly all of the declarations were 
from sales representatives or others associated with the flashlight 
retail business.154  
Finally, the TTAB noted that the sales and advertising evidence 
that Mag Instrument submitted to show secondary meaning did not 
specifically indicate the dual bands as a source identifier:  “[t]here is 
no evidence that Mag Instrument ever placed any ‘look for’ 
advertisements or otherwise made promotional efforts to create 
consumer association between the dual bands, or recharging rings, 
with the source of the flashlights.”155  On the contrary, the TTAB 
found that Mag Instrument’s advertising emphasized the utilitarian 
attributes of the dual bands, not their value as a trademark.156  Thus, 
even absent the TTAB’s conclusion that the dual bands were 
functional, the TTAB found that Mag Instrument would not be 
entitled to a trademark because the dual band configuration mark 
had not acquired distinctiveness.157 
C. Descriptiveness; Acquired Distinctiveness 
1. Dalton v. Honda Motor Co. 
The Federal Circuit halted Dalton’s pro se attempt to defend the 
registration of the mark DEALERDASHBOARD.158  Honda opposed 
                                                          
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1723. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1724. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Dalton v. Honda Motor Co., 425 F. App’x 886, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per 
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the mark at the TTAB, after its American subsidiary received a cease-
and-desist letter from Dalton.159  In its opposition, Honda claimed 
that, in the automotive industry, DEALERDASHBOARD “is a generic 
term, or, at best, a merely descriptive term.”160  The TTAB found that 
DEALERDASHBORD is merely descriptive.161  The TTAB further 
noted that Dalton had not argued that the mark had acquired 
distinctiveness, so he could not overcome the TTAB’s finding that the 
mark was merely descriptive.162  
On appeal, Dalton argued that the TTAB should not have found 
that the mark was merely descriptive, and it should have considered 
third-party registrations containing the terms DEALER or 
DASHBOARD.163  Beginning with the descriptiveness issue, the 
Federal Circuit reviewed the dictionary definition of the term 
“dealer” in the record, which is “one engaged in buying and 
selling.”164  The court then considered what the word “dashboard” 
means in context.165  Relying on evidence that Honda submitted, the 
court defined this type of dashboard as “an Internet-based system that 
provides dealers with key performance indicators.”166  The court 
noted that the TTAB also relied on the listing of services Dalton 
identified in his application.167  The services listing described a 
DEALERDASHBOARD as “the graphical display of sales, service and 
other information relating to businesses engaged in buying and 
selling goods, particularly automobiles.”168  
After considering this evidence, the court adopted the TTAB’s 
conclusion that Dalton’s mark “merely describes, without conjecture 
or speculation” the services listing.169  Finally, the court agreed with 
Honda that, in this situation, Dalton’s combination of two terms does 
not change the descriptive nature of the mark.170  The court, like the 
                                                          
curiam). 
 159. Id.   
 160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Id. at 889.   
 162. Id.  The TTAB and the Federal Circuit also addressed procedural issues of 
standing and admissibility of evidence.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 163. Id. at 891.   
 164. Id. at 892 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.   
 168. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. See id. at 893 (quoting In re Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 1018, 1020 (T.T.A.B. 1983)) (noting that a combination of descriptive terms 
might be registrable “if the juxtaposition of the words is inventive or evokes a unique 
commercial impression, or if the term has a bizarre or incongruous meaning as 
applied to the goods”). 
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TTAB, noted that Dalton did not assert in his application that his 
mark had acquired secondary meaning, and he offered no evidence 
to support such a claim.171  Therefore, the court upheld the TTAB’s 
conclusion that DEALERDASHBOARD is a merely descriptive 
mark.172 
On the question of third-party registrations, the Federal Circuit 
reminded Dalton that “a merely descriptive mark does not qualify for 
registration simply because other similar marks appear on the 
register.”173  Thus, it concluded that the TTAB was justified when it 
considered only the registrability of Dalton’s mark in the context of 
the relevant services.174  Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the TTAB’s decision to sustain Honda’s opposition and refuse 
Dalton’s registration of the mark.175 
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES 
The Federal Circuit’s procedural decisions in 2011 demonstrate 
that the court takes the TTAB’s discovery process seriously.  It showed 
little sympathy for TTAB litigants who failed to follow procedural 
rules, even if the meaning or effect of certain rules may be subject to 
debate. 
A. Standing to Sue; Admissibility of Evidence 
1. Dalton v. Honda Motor Co. 
In addition to the substantive questions discussed above,176 the 
Dalton opinion covered the procedural issues of standing and 
whether late-produced evidence may be excluded from the record.177  
Dalton argued that Honda did not have standing to oppose his 
registration because Honda is a foreign corporation, and he had only 
sent a cease-and-desist letter to American Honda.178  American Honda 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Honda Motor Company, the parent 
company that filed the opposition.179   
The standing requirements for oppositions are conferred both by 
statute, in section 13 of the Lanham Act, and by common law judicial 
                                                          
 171. Id.   
 172. Id. at 893–94.  
 173. Id. at 894. 
 174. Id.   
 175. Id.   
 176. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 177. 425 F. App’x at 889–91, 894–95. 
 178. Id. at 890.   
 179. Id. at 891.   
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decisions that interpret the statutory standing requirements.180  The 
Lanham Act allows anyone “who believes that he would be damaged 
by the registration of a mark” to oppose it.181  The judicially-created 
standard for demonstrating standing further requires a showing of:  
“(1) a ‘real interest’ in the proceeding; and (2) a ‘reasonable basis’ 
for believing that [the opposer] would suffer damage if the mark is 
registered.”182 
The court explained that a parent company has standing to oppose 
a trademark application on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiary 
because damage to the subsidiary could lead to damage to the parent 
company.183  That Honda Motor Company is a foreign entity did not 
factor into this analysis.184  The Federal Circuit commented that 
although the TTAB did not discuss the parent-subsidiary relationship 
in its decision, it applied the correct test to find that Honda Motor 
Company, the parent company, had standing.185  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the TTAB correctly determined that Honda Motor 
Company had standing to oppose Dalton’s registration.186 
The final procedural point in this case involved the TTAB’s 
decision to exclude documents Dalton attempted to introduce 
during his deposition.  During the discovery period, Dalton initially 
failed to respond to Honda’s discovery requests, and he produced a 
small set of documents only after the TTAB issued an order granting 
Honda’s motion to compel discovery.187  At his deposition, however, 
Dalton sought to introduce a large number of documents that he had 
not previously provided.188 
The TTAB cited, with approval, other cases in which it had 
excluded evidence that had not been produced during discovery.189  
Moreover, the TTAB noted that the excluded evidence would not 
change the outcome of the case.190  Based on these considerations, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision to exclude the 
evidence.191 
                                                          
 180. Id. at 889–90 (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 181. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2006)). 
 182. Id. at 890 (citing Simpson, 170 F.3d at 1095, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 890–91. 
 185. Id. at 891. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 894–95. 
 188. Id. at 895. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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B. Default Judgment; Timing of Suspension 
1. Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc. 
The final Federal Circuit trademark decision issued in 2011 
covered purely procedural issues in a precedential decision.192  
Additionally, this case cost the trademark owner his registration—just 
one week after he had renewed it.193  
Benedict held trademark registrations for G THE GOODYMAN for 
pepperoni sticks and bakery goods like cupcakes, cookies, and 
donuts.194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Super Bakery applied for a trademark registration for GOODY MAN 
for similar bakery goods.195  
The examining attorney rejected Super Bakery’s application, 
stating that the proposed mark was likely to be confused with 
Benedict’s mark.196  In July 2007, after this rejection, Super Bakery 
asked the PTO to cancel Benedict’s mark, arguing that Benedict had 
abandoned the mark and committed fraud.197  In January and 
February 2008, Super Bakery served discovery requests on Benedict.198 
Beginning in mid-February 2008, Benedict, a pro se party, failed to 
respond to several pleadings in the proceeding, including discovery 
requests, a motion to compel discovery, and the TTAB’s order 
granting the motion to compel.199  In August 2008, Super Bakery 
                                                          
 192. Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 665 F.3d 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 193. Benedict filed his Section 8 application to renew the mark on Dec. 16, 2011, 
and the PTO accepted the renewal on Dec. 20, 2011.  See Prosecution History for 
Registration No. 296622, TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS AND REGISTRATIONS RETRIEVAL 
(TARR), available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/tarr?regser=serial&entry=78232100& 
action=Request+Status.  The Federal Circuit’s opinion was issued on Dec. 28, 2011.  
Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.   
 194. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089–90. 
 195. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 196. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 197. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 198. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 199. Id. at 1264–65, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089–90. 
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asked the TTAB for a default judgment based on Benedict’s failure to 
comply with the TTAB’s order compelling a discovery response.200  
Benedict finally responded and filed a request for reconsideration of 
the discovery order, claiming he had not received the TTAB order 
until his time to comply had almost expired.201  Although the TTAB 
deemed Benedict’s response untimely, it gave him the opportunity to 
respond to the discovery requests within thirty days, by March 13, 
2009.202 
On March 12, 2009 (day twenty-nine), Benedict filed a motion for 
summary judgment—on somewhat dubious grounds—and he still did 
not respond to the discovery requests.203  After filing his summary 
judgment motion, he invoked Trademark Rule 2.127(d),204 which 
states: 
When any party files . . . a motion for summary judgment, or any 
other motion which is potentially dispositive of a proceeding, the 
case will be suspended by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
with respect to all matters not germane to the motion and no party 
should file any paper which is not germane to the motion except as 
otherwise specified in the Board’s suspension order.  If the case is 
not disposed of as a result of the motion, proceedings will be 
resumed pursuant to an order of the Board when the motion is 
decided.205 
In other words, under this Rule, no party is allowed to file anything 
unrelated to a dispositive motion once the case has been suspended.  
The TTAB issued its order suspending the case on March 30, 2009.206 
Two weeks later, Super Bakery asked the TTAB for sanctions, 
default judgment, and cancellation of Benedict’s mark.207  The TTAB 
agreed, stating that the case was not actually suspended until after the 
TTAB issued a suspension order, so Benedict was still required to 
meet the March 13 discovery deadline after he filed his summary 
judgment brief.208  The TTAB entered default judgment against 
Benedict and cancelled the mark.209 
In 2010, Benedict appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit, 
which sent the case back to the TTAB because the TTAB had not 
                                                          
 200. Id. at 1265, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 201. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 202. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 203. Id. at 1265–66, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090–91. 
 204. 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2011). 
 205. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1265–66, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting 37 
C.F.R. § 2.127(d)). 
 206. Id. at 1266, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 207. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 208. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
 209. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
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clearly explained in its prior opinion how Trademark Rule 2.127(d) 
applied to the facts of this case.210  In response to the Federal Circuit’s 
remand, the TTAB elaborated on its interpretation and application 
of Trademark Rule 2.127(d) to this case.211  The TTAB primarily 
relied on a comment and response made during the formal notice-
and-comment process after the rule was proposed:   
Comment:  One organization suggested the section should be 
amended to provide that the filing of a potentially dispositive 
motion automatically suspends proceedings, without any action by 
the Board. 
Response:  The suggested modification has not been adopted. A 
variety of motions are potentially dispositive, including a motion 
for sanctions in the form of entry of judgment.  Because of the 
number of situations in which a party may make a potentially 
dispositive motion, it is believed better for the Board to determine 
whether proceedings should be suspended based on the situation 
presented by the particular case.212 
The TTAB concluded that the comment indicates a case is not 
suspended the moment a summary judgment motion is filed.213  
Rather, the case continues to move forward until the TTAB actually 
issues a suspension order.214  
The TTAB also noted that “there was ‘a strong showing of willful 
evasion’ of discovery” on Benedict’s part and ruled that his summary 
judgment motion was “without merit.”215  Benedict appealed the 
TTAB’s second decision, arguing that the TTAB’s interpretation of 
the rule is not what the plain language of the rule actually states.216  
Benedict claimed that he followed the rule as it is written.217 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Benedict that the TTAB’s 
interpretation of Trademark Rule 2.127(d) is not dictated by the 
                                                          
 210. See Flohr et al., supra note 3, at 1195–96 (summarizing the procedural history 
and the Federal Circuit’s 2010 opinion of Benedict). 
 211. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1266, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
 212. Id. at 1266–67, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (quoting Miscellaneous 
Changes to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,081, 48,094 
(Sept. 9, 1998)). 
 213. Id. at 1267, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
 214. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
 215. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091–92.  Benedict argued that the doctrine of 
res judicata barred Super Bakery’s petition for cancellation based on the examining 
attorney’s final office action issued with respect to Super Bakery’s application.  Id., 
101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091–92.  The office action stated that there was a 
likelihood of confusion between Super Bakery’s mark and Mr. Benedict’s registered 
mark.  Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091–92.   
 216. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 217. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
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plain language of the rule.218  On this point, the court concluded, 
“[t]his ambiguity [in the language of the rule] does not support the 
extreme sanction of default judgment.”219 
The court affirmed the TTAB’s decision, however, because of 
Benedict’s behavior.220  In spite of the ambiguity in Trademark Rule 
2.127(d), Benedict clearly violated the Trademark Rules concerning 
responding to discovery requests and complying with TTAB orders.221  
Furthermore, Trademark Rule 2.120(g) states clearly that “if a party 
fails to comply with an order of the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board relating to disclosure or discovery” the TTAB may issue an 
appropriate order to remedy the violation.222 
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that Benedict’s long history of 
ignoring his obligations in this case justified the TTAB’s order 
entering default judgment and cancelling Benedict’s mark.223 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s 2011 trademark decisions did not 
introduce major changes to trademark law and doctrine.  However, 
the court’s Citigroup and Benedict decisions identified areas where the 
TTAB should hone or clarify its rules and practices.  Also, the Estrada 
and Benedict opinions indicated the Federal Circuit’s expectation of 
cooperation and candor from litigants at the TTAB.  So although the 
Federal Circuit issued few trademark decisions last year, those 
decisions still provide insight into the court’s approach to trademark 
law and procedure.  
 
                                                          
 218. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 219. Id. at 1268, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.   
 220. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092–93. 
 221. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 222. 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(g) (2011). 
 223. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1269, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093. 
